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Partners Without Power: Protecting Law
Firm Partners from Discrimination
By LAUREN WINTERS*
IT IS UNDISPUTED that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act1 ("Ti-
de VII") applies to law firm partnerships; however, under traditional
jurisprudence, equity partners are not entitled to Title VII protection
from the discriminatory acts of other equity partners or the discrimi-
natory actions of the partnership as a whole. 2 This is because courts
have held that partners do not fall within the statutory definition of
the term "employee."3 Such logic is flawed, however, because Title VII
does not provide a substantive definition of "employee." Instead, it
defines an employee as an "individual employed by an employer. '4 In
deciding that partners do not fall within the statutory definition of
"employee," courts have relied on the traditional notion that all part-
ners are equal, possessing the same ability to affect or remedy partner-
ship conduct.5 This is at odds with the current structure of many law
firms. Firms today may have two classes of partners: equity and non-
equity partners.6 The significant differences between equity and non-
equity partners are that non-equity partners do not have the right to
vote at partnership meetings; they do not share in the partnership
profits; and they do not have an ownership interest in the firm. 7 Fur-
thermore, the size or structure of firms today may create a situation
that effectively divests equity partners of significant management con-
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1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
2. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79-80 (1984) (Powell,J., concurring); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(a) -(b).
3. Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 868 (7th Cir. 1977).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
5. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 79-80 (Powell, J., concurring); Burke, 556 F.2d at 869.
6. See William C. Cobb, Making the Move... Changing Equity Partners to Non-Equity
Status, OF COUNSEL, Mar. 2002, at 10.
7. Mark Curriden, No Tears for Two Tiers-More and More Firms Are Sure Non-Equity
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trol and job security 8 In both instances, an equity partner does not
have access to the remedial provisions of Title VII. Thus, it is possible
to be an equity partner and be subject to professional peril based on
the unlawful employment practices of fellow equity partners and the
partnership.
Whether equity law partners must work in a sexually or racially
hostile work environment raises the issue of whether Congress in-
tended to exclude individual partners from the protections of Title
VII. Law firm partnerships should no longer receive an automatic ex-
emption from liability when an equity partner alleges that the firm has
engaged in unlawful discriminatory conduct. It is a well-established
principle that pervasive sexual or racial hostility in the workplace vio-
lates Title VII.9 Courts look to the totality of the circumstances to de-
termine whether the conduct is hostile or abusive, considering,
among other things, whether the conduct was "physically threatening
or humiliating" and "whether it unreasonably interferes with [the
plaintiff's] work performance."' 0 Equity partners should be able to
bring Title VII claims against law firm partnerships because Congress
granted the victims of discrimination a private right of action against
the perpetrators of workplace discrimination. 1
Congress used a term of art when it described persons eligible to
bring Title VII claims as "person[s] adversely affected or aggrieved."12
Under Title VII, an aggrieved person may bring a discrimination
8. See, e.g., Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 867-68 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that a physician-partner in a 2,400 plus partnership may be entitled to
employee status because the number of doctor-partners limited her ability to affect part-
nership policy).
9. Under Title VII, an employer is prohibited from discriminating against an em-
ployee with respect to the employee's "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1). Likewise, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibits em-
ployers from discriminating against employees on the basis of age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)
(2000). Finally, the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits employers from discriminat-
ing against employees with disabilities on the basis of the disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(2).
This Article uses Title VII for its analysis; however, all three statutes use the same statutory
definition of employee: "an individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f); 42
U.S.C. § 12112(4). Therefore, it is reasonable to discuss the courts' interpretation of em-
ployee under each of these statutes interchangeably.
10. Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
12. See Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 126 (1995) (explaining that "[tihe phrase 'person adversely af-
fected or aggrieved' is a term of art used in many statutes to designate those who have
standing to challenge or appeal an agency decision, within the agency or before the
courts").
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claim against the respondent named in the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission ("EEOC") charge.13 According to federal juris-
prudence, a person is aggrieved if the respondent's action did in fact
injure the person seeking Title VII protection and the person's com-
plaint falls within the zone of interests protected by Title VII. 1 4 Inter-
preting the term "employee" to include aggrieved equity partners is
consistent with Congress's goal to eliminate discriminatory conduct
that pollutes the American workplace. 15 Despite Congress's mandate,
courts have declined to exercise jurisdiction over discrimination law-
suits between law firm partners and partnerships, reasoning that part-
ners are not eligible to claim the protection of Title VII.1
6
As partnerships became professional corporations, courts were
required to determine whether shareholders were entitled to bring
discrimination claims against them. This meant that courts had to de-
termine whether shareholders fell within the statutory definition of
employee under laws prohibiting workplace discrimination.17 The cir-
cuits used one of two tests to determine whether courts had jurisdic-
tion over a shareholder's discrimination lawsuit.
Under the first test, courts held that a professional corporation
was analogous to a partnership.18 In deciding whether the share-
holder was analogous to a partner, courts considered the following
factors: (1) whether the shareholder's compensation was based on the
firm's profits; (2) whether the shareholder was liable for the firm's
debts and obligations; and (3) whether the shareholder had a right to
vote on matters concerning the firm's operation.1 9 Under this ap-
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1).
14. Newport News, 514 U.S. at 127.
15. "[A] broad reading of the term 'employee' [is] consistent with the statutory pur-
pose of ridding the nation of unlawful workplace discrimination"; thus, courts should liber-
ally construe Tide VII statutory provisions to limit the number of partnerships that can
escape liability for their unlawful discriminatory conduct against members of the partner-
ship. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 446 n.6 (2003).
16. See, e.g., Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 991-92 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that,
under the totality of the circumstances, the evidence showed that the plaintiff was not an
employee but an equity partner, and, therefore, the plaintiff was ineligible to claim Title
VII protection); Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, 100 F.3d 78, 82 (8th Cir. 1996)
(refusing to exercise jurisdiction because defendant was not an "employer" that could be
sued under Title VII).
17. See EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984).
18. Id. at 1178.
19. Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., 925 F.2d 1398, 1399 (lth Cir. 1991) (finding
that the plaintiff was not entitled to employee status because the plaintiff had the right to
vote on amendments to the firm's agreement, admission of new shareholders, termination
of a shareholder's interest, and approval of compensation including the distribution of net
profits).
Winter 2005)
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
proach, a court did not have jurisdiction over a shareholder's discrimi-
nation claim if the shareholder had the right to control how the
business would operate, had a right to share in the business's profits,
and was liable for the business's debts and obligations.
Under the second test, courts focused on the decision of the
shareholders to incorporate. 20 Courts following this approach held
that the decision to incorporate and reap the rewards and benefits of
incorporation prevented shareholders from arguing that they were
analogous to partners in a partnership. 21 Under this analysis, courts
had jurisdiction to hear a shareholder's discrimination claim based on
the fact that the firm was a professional corporation. 22
In 2003, the Supreme Court abrogated the two tests. 23 The Court
adopted a control test to determine whether, under laws prohibiting
workplace discrimination, shareholders in a professional corporation
fell within the statutory definition of "employee."24 Under the control
test, courts must focus on whether the shareholder is subject to the
control of the professional corporation. 25 In making this determina-
tion, courts should consider such factors as whether the corporation
can hire or fire the shareholder; whether, and to what extent, the cor-
poration supervises the shareholder's work; whether the shareholder
shares in the corporation's profits, losses, and liabilities; and whether
the shareholder is able to influence the decision-making process of
the corporation.26 The control test offers non-equity law partners ac-
cess to Title VII protections because they do not have an ownership
interest in the law firm partnership, they do not share in the firm's
profits, and they do not have a right to vote in how the firm will con-
duct its business.27
For example, in 2002, the EEOC used the control test to deter-
mine whether thirty-one demoted partners at the Sidley Austin law
firm were entitled to protection under federal law prohibiting dis-
crimination based on the employee's age. 28 InJanuary 2005, based on
its investigation, the EEOC filed a lawsuit against Sidley Austin, alleg-
20. See Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986).
21. Id. at 798.
22. Id.
23. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 451 (2003).
24. Id. at 449-50.
25. Id.
26. Id. (construing EEOC Compliance Manual).
27. See Cobb, supra note 6, at 10. While there are no reported cases applying the
control test to non-equity partners, this conclusion is a relatively straightforward applica-
tion of the control test.
28. EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002).
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ing that the law firm implemented and maintained an age-based re-
tirement policy.29 Using the control test, the EEOC maintained that
the demoted partners were employees for purposes of federal anti-
discrimination law because they did not have the attributes associated
with being an equity partner.
The control test, however, ignores the inability of equity partners
to protect themselves from discrimination if they lack the power to
force the firm to take remedial action to eliminate the discrimination
despite possessing other attributes of being an equity partner.30 An
equity partner should be entitled to the remedial protections of Title
VII if she can prove that she has standing to invoke federal jurisdic-
tion. This approach ensures that law firms will not discriminate
against equity partners; if they do, they will face the legal conse-
quences of their unlawful employment practices.
This Article examines the implications of the control test on the
ability of non-equity and equity partners to bring discrimination
claims against their law firms. Part I traces the development of the law
that led to the adoption of the control test. Part II examines the limi-
tations of the control test in determining whether an equity law part-
ner is entitled to the protections of federal law prohibiting workplace
discrimination. Finally, Part III suggests a three-part test based on Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green3 1 to determine whether equity law part-
ners are entitled to protection under laws prohibiting workplace
discrimination.32 This three-part test would require the aggrieved
partner or shareholder to establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion. If the partner is able to meet the initial burden, the firm would
have to show that the partner or shareholder enjoyed the full benefits
and protections of partnership or ownership status. The burden
would then shift back to the aggrieved partner to produce evidence
showing that (1) the partner lacked the power and control to force
the firm to take remedial action to eliminate the illegal discrimina-
tion, and (2) other partners, either through the firm's executive com-
mittee or managing partner, knew of the discrimination and failed to
take remedial action to eliminate it.
29. William Sluis, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood: EEOC Files Age-Discrimination Suit, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 16, 2005, at 3.
30. See, e.g., Sidley Austin, 315 F.3d at 704 (acknowledging that an equity partner's
liability for the partnership's debts is meaningless if the equity partner is subject to unlaw-
ful workplace discrimination).
31. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
32. Id. at 802-04.
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I. Unequal Protection Under the Law
Traditionally, the fact that a plaintiff was a partner in a law firm-
prevented the plaintiff from suing the firm for discriminatory acts that
occurred while the plaintiff was a partner.33 For example, consider the
story of Abby. Abbyjoined her law firm as an associate in 1994. The
firm had more than seventy equity partners, twenty-five associates, and
approximately fifty administrative and clerical employees. Rob, a part-
ner and member of the firm's executive committee, supervised Abby's
work. During that time period, Rob made personal comments to Abby
about her appearance, including how she looked in certain outfits.
While working with him, Abby complained to the firm's managing
partner that Rob had a pornographic screen saver on his work
computer.
In 2001, Abby became a partner. To "celebrate" her promotion,
Rob circulated throughout the firm a mock advertisement featuring
Abby. The advertisement welcomed Abby to the partnership. It stated
that, over the years, Abby had satisfied many clients' needs. The adver-
tisement listed the names of famous men known for their sexual ex-
ploits as Abby's satisfied clients. Rob also sent sexually suggestive
poetry to the partners, which Abby received. Abby filed a formal com-
plaint with the firm's executive committee, but the executive commit-
tee took no action. After Abby became a partner, Rob suggested that
they step up their relationship from colleagues to "true" partners. He
asked Abby to join him on vacations and began calling her at home.
Abby told Rob that his advances and comments were unwelcome. Still,
everyone in the firm came to believe that Rob and Abby were having
an office affair.
Now Abby wants to assert a Title VII claim against the law firm for
Rob's conduct that occurred while she was an associate. If a reasona-
ble person standing in Abby's shoes would find the workplace so ob-
jectively and subjectively sexually hostile that it created an abusive
working environment, she might have a successful claim as to the con-
duct that occurred while she was an associate.3 4 But Abby's promotion
33. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring); Burke
v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
34. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998) (explain-
ing that the reasonable person standard used to determine workplace hostility should be
based on the perspective of a reasonable person sharing the characteristics of the plain-
tiff); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that, in the context of
a sexual harassment claim, courts were to use a reasonable woman standard to determine
whether the working environment was hostile). Cf McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d
1103, 1115 (9th Cir. 2004) (" [A] llegations of a racially hostile workplace must be assessed
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will prevent her from holding the firm liable for the discriminatory
acts that occurred while she was a partner. 35 Abby's Title VII claim will
fail because courts traditionally hold that, as a matter of law, a bona
fide equity partner cannot state a colorable discrimination claim
against a partnership. 36 Courts routinely reason that equity partners
are not entitled to employee status under laws prohibiting workplace
discrimination because they are co-owners who manage and control
the partnership. Contrary to the belief that individual partners possess
the ability to affect partnership policy, many equity partners lack the
bargaining power to protect themselves from the discriminatory con-
duct of their fellow equity partners and the partnership as a whole. 37
Becoming a partner in a law firm leaves women, lawyers of color, and
older attorneys vulnerable to unlawful employment practices, such as
sexual harassment.38 Thus, despite the economic benefits of being an
equity partner, Abby would face professional peril because, even
though the firm knew of the harassment, it failed to take any steps to
eliminate it and Abby's single partnership vote could not force the
firm to take action against Rob. Abby's only choice to remedy the situ-
from the perspective a reasonable person belonging to the racial or ethnic group of the
plaintiff.").
35. See Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1986)
("It is generally accepted that the benefits of the antidiscrimination statutes [prohibiting
unlawful employment practices] ... do not extend to those who properly are classified as
partners."). Cf Hishon, 467 U.S. at 80 n.2 (explaining that a partnership cannot avoid Title
VII liability by simply "labeling" employees "partners").
36. See Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 869 n.1 (7th Cir. 1977) ("[I]f the attorneys
[arc] partners in [a] law firm rather than associates, they [will] not be considered to be
employees [for purposes of federal laws prohibiting workplace discrimination]."); accord
Hishon, 467 U.S. at 79-80 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The reasoning of the Court's opinion
[that an associate may bring a Title VII action against a law firm partnership] does not
require that the relationship among partners be characterized as an 'employment' rela-
tionship to which Title VII would apply.").
37. See EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 700 (7th Cir. 2002).
38. Three-quarters of women lawyers believe that sex discrimination is a problem
within the workplace. Recent surveys found that one-half to two-thirds of female lawyers
report experiencing or observing sexual harassment. ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PRO-
FESSION, THE UNFINISHED AGENDA 19 (2001). The number of complaints concerning sex
discrimination has doubled since 1991. According to the ABA report, "About 90% of re-
ported [sexual harassment] complaints are from women, and many pay a substantial price
in both economic and psychological terms, such as loss of employment opportunities, un-
wanted transfers, anxiety, depression, and other stress-related conditions." Id. at 19. The
ABA report also states that (1) women of color and other identifiable subgroups face racial
and sexual bias, (2) homophobicjokes and comments are not uncommon among lawyers,
and (3) lawyers with disabilities report "disparaging remarks and lack of reasonable accom-
modations." Id. at 21. "Women also report recurring instances of being ignored, inter-
rupted, or mistaken for nonprofessional support staff." Id. at 21.
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ation would be to leave the firm or suffer the consequences of being
an equity partner subject to the harassment of a fellow partner.
A. The Evolution of Employee Status
Congress expressly included partnerships in the definition of
"employei" when it enacted laws prohibiting workplace discrimina-
tion; however, Congress did not address whether the individual part-
ners fell within the statutory definition of "employee."3 9 Courts have
assumed chat partners are excluded from the definition of "employee"
based upon the common law principle that a partnership does not
have an independent legal identity. 40 Under this "aggregate" theory of
partnership law, a partner cannot sue the partnership because the
partner would, in effect, be suing herself.41 The Uniform Partnership
Act42 ("UPA") adopted and codified common law principles of part-
nership law, including the common law principle that a partnership
and its partners are a single unit.43 Thus, it was inconceivable that a
partner could sue the partnership for anything other than a breach of
fiduciary duties. 44
Prior to 2003, when the Supreme Court decided Clackamas Gastro-
enterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells,45 the leading case that addressed
whether a partner was entitled to employee status under Title VII was
Burke v. Friedman.46 In Burke, the Seventh Circuit considered whether
an accounting firm had the requisite fifteen employees to trigger ap-
plication of Title VII. To trigger Title VII, the firm's four partners had
to fall within the statutory definition of employee. 47 The Seventh Cir-
39. Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985-86 (1st Cir. 1997).
40. See Burke, 556 F.2d at 869.
41. See ALLAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNER-
sHips § 6.08(c) (3d ed, 1994).
42. UNIF. P'sHIe AcT OF 1914, 6 U.L.A. 275 (2001).
43. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 443-44 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing
common law principles as codified in the UPA); Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d 590, 591 (2d
Cir. 1937) (rejecting the argument that the UPA made the partnership an "independent
juristic entity").
44. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79-80 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring)
("The essence of the law partnership is the common conduct of a shared enterprise."). Cf
Burke, 556 F.2d at 869 ("[W]e do not see how partners can be regarded as employees
rather than as employers who own and manage the operation of the business."). Under
general principles of partnership law, a partner cannot bring a breach of contract claim
against the partnership. See, e.g., George Morris Cruises v. Irwin Yacht & Marine Corp., 478
N.W.2d 693 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
45. 538 U.S. 440 (2003).
46. 556 F.2d 867, 868 (7th Cir. 1977).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
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cuit held that the partnership was not subject to Title VII, finding that,
as a matter of law, a partner who owned and managed the operation
of the accounting firm could not be an employee under Title VII.48
The Burke analysis, however, ignored three important facts. First,
a partnership has a legal identity separate and apart from the mem-
bers of the partnership. 49 That is, it can sue and be sued in its own
name.50 Second, a partnership and its partners may have a master-
servant relationship. 51 Specifically, a law firm partnership may dictate
the parameters of the partner's work, such as what cases the partner
may take, how the partner will charge a client for services performed
on a case, and what partnership resources, such as associates and staff,
the partner may use when working on a case.52 Third, law firm part-
nerships have characteristics and attributes of corporations.53 Large
and mid-size law firms have administrative committees, with control of
48. Burke, 556 F.2d at 869.
49. Cf Rowland v. Cal. Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194,
202 (1993) (interpreting the rule that corporations are prohibited from appearing pro se
in federal court as applying to all artificial entities).
50. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) (stating that a partnership "may sue or be sued in its
common name for the purpose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right existing
under the Constitution or the laws of the United States"). Accord OR. R. Civ. P. 26B. Ore-
gon Rule of Civil Procedure states:
Any partnership or other unincorporated association, whether organized for
profit or not, may sue in any name which it has assumed and be sued in any name
which it has assumed or by which it is known. Any member of the partnership or
other unincorporated association may bejoined as a party in an action against the
partnership or unincorporated association.
Id. See also Lexis-Nexis v. Travishan Corp., 573 S.E.2d 547, 549 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (find-
ing that, to appear in court, a corporation must be represented by a licensed attorney);
Valentine L.L.C. v. Flexible Bus. Solutions, L.L.C., No. 9905892308, 2000 WL 960901, at *1
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 22, 2000) (determining that limited liability companies must be
represented by counsel to appear in court).
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14a (1958).
52. Gone are the genteel days of Atticus Finch in Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird
Today's motto is "the business of law is business." See Edward S. Adams & Stuart Albert, Law
Redesigns Law: Legal Principles as Principles of Law Firm Organization, 51 RUTGERS L. REv. 1133,
1139 (1999) ("The evolution in the late twentieth century of the ethical standards gov-
erning lawyers provides more evidence of the identity shift that law has experienced as the
practice becomes more and more like a business."). Firms carefully calculate the costs of
inviting associates to become partners based on their contributions to the firm's bottom
line and firm resources. JOHN G. IEZZI, COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR LAW OFFICES, How
TO CALCULATE THE COSTS OF NEW PARTNER ADMISSIONS 10 (2003-04).
53. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 2002)
(finding that a self-perpetuating executive committee controlled the law firm and that the
committee controlled important terms and conditions of employment such as partnership
compensation and the right to fire, promote, and demote partners). See generally Thomas F.
Gibbons, Law Practice in 2001, 76 A.B.A. J. 69, 71 (1990) (explaining that law firms will no
longer operate as true partnerships in the twenty-first century; instead, a management
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the firm's affairs resting in the hands of an executive committee or
managing partner.54
Indeed, the practice and the business of law have changed in the
twenty years since Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Hishon v.
King & Spalding.55 Justice Powell stated that "[t]he relationship
among law partners contemplates that decisions important to the
partnership normally will be made by common agreement ... or con-
sent among the partners."56 Today, instead of the common law part-
ner/partnership relationship, a partner may have a relationship with
her law firm that resembles the common law master-servant relation-
ship. Law firms have developed multi-tiered partnerships "to keep well
trained lawyers who understand the culture and clients of the law
firm" and "to provide . . . a consistent compensation package with
benefits to people who do not have the talent or capabilities to materi-
ally affect the revenues of the firm."57 Other partnerships have in-
creased in size and have limited the rights of partners to fully
participate in the management of the partnership. 58 Because of these
changes, courts should exercise jurisdiction over an equity partner's
discrimination claim if the evidence shows that the equity partner is
unable to eliminate the unlawful discriminatory conduct, regardless of
the firm's organizational structure or its size.
Recognizing that partnerships no longer operate in the manner
that Justice Powell suggested in Hishon, courts correctly refuse to find
the "partner" label dispositive in determining whether jurisdiction ex-
ists over a partner's discrimination claim against the partnership. In
Simpson v. Ernst & Young,59 the plaintiff, a managing partner in a
2,200-member partnership, sued his employer, an accounting firm,
for allegedly violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 6°
committee or a managing partner would assume responsibility for the decision-making
process).
54. See Sidley Austin, 315 F.3d at 702-03 (finding that Sidley Austin is a "partnership of
more than 500 partners in which all power resides in a small, unelected committee" that
has thirty-six members).
55. 467 U.S. 69, 79-81 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that an associate could
bring a Title VII action against the law firm partnership for failing to promote her to
partner).
56. Id. at 80 (Powell, J., concurring).
57. Cobb, supra note 6, at 10.
58. See, e.g., Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that
a partner in a firm with almost 2,200 "partners" lacked the ability to affect partnership
policy and other meaningful attributes of being a partner).
59. 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996).
60. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
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("ADEA"), Employment Retirement Income Security Act 61 ("ERISA"),
and state laws prohibiting workplace discrimination. 62 The district
court denied the accounting firm's motion for summary judgment,
finding that the plaintiff was an employee under laws prohibiting
workplace discrimination. 63 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding
that the evidence showed that "[the plaintiff] had no bona fide owner-
ship interest, no fiduciary relationship, no share in the profits and
losses, no significant management control, no meaningful voting
rights, no meaningful vote in firm decisions, and no job security."64
Consequently, the plaintiff possessed none of the "meaningful attrib-
utes of being a partner. 65
In reaching its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit stated there was no
substantive conflict between the "economic realities" test and com-
mon law agency principles.66 The court recognized that "the underly-
ing common denominator of the employer/employee rubric [is] the
employer's ability to control job performance and employment oppor-
tunities. '67 Relying on precedent, the Sixth Circuit stated that the "em-
ployer's ability to control the job performance and the employment opportunities
of the plaintiff is the most important factoa' in determining whether the
plaintiff was a partner or an employee. 68 A partner is not entitled to
employee status if the partner has equal right to manage the busi-
ness's affairs, has apparent authority to bind the business contractu-
ally, has the power to subject the business to liability for torts
committed within the scope of the business, is compensated based on
the business's profits, and is personally liable for the business's
debts.69 In thi instance, a court would not have jurisdiction to hear
the partner's discrimination claim against the partnership because in
theory the meaningful attributes of being an equity partner should
afford protections against partnership discrimination. 70
The Ninth Circuit also addressed whether a partner fell within
the statutory definition of employee in Strother v. Southern California
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
62. Simpson, 100 F.3d at 439.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 442-44.
65. Id. at 442.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 443-44.
70. See EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 704 (7th Cir. 2002) (ex-
plaining that one of the meaningful attributes of being an equity partner is the ability to
protect oneself from unlawful discrimination).
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Permanente Medical Group.71 In Strother, the plaintiff was a physician-
partner in a partnership that had more than 2,400 partners.72 The
plaintiff sued the partnership under state discrimination la.ws. 73 The
district court dismissed the plaintiffs discrimination claims, holding
that she was not entitled to employee status because she was a part-
ner.7 4 The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the dis-
trict court erred in deciding that the plaintiff was a partner based solely
on the complaint, the partnership agreement, and the fact that the
partnership labeled the plaintiff a partner. 75 Instead, the Ninth Cir-
cuit required the district court to analyze the partnership's economic
structure and the manner in which the partnership operated to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff was entitled to employee status. 76 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that the true nature of the partnership could
not be determined without answering questions about "how the part-
nership actually conductled] itself."77
The First Circuit specifically addressed whether a partner en-
gaged in the practice of law was entitled to Title VII protection in
Serapion v. Martinez.78 In that case, the district court granted the de-
fendants' motion for summary judgment.79 It held that the plaintiff
"was not an employee as that term had been developed in federal ju-
risprudence" and, therefore, she was not entitled to pursue a Title VII
action against her former partners. 80 The court affirmed, holding that
the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because
the undisputed evidence showed that the plaintiff was an equity part-
ner.8 1 The First Circuit reasoned that the distinction between a part-
ner and an employee must be based on a totality of the
circumstances, 82 stating that "[a] court must peer beneath the label
and probe the actual circumstances of the person's relationship with
the partnership. '"8 3
71. 79 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1996).
72. Id. at 863, 867.
73. Id. at 863.
74. Id. at 864.
75. Id. at 867-68.
76. Id. at 867.
77. Id.
78. Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 984 (1st Cir. 1997).
79. Id. at 986.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 992.
82. Id. at 990.
83. Id. at 987.
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According to the First Circuit, in determining employee status
under the totality of the circumstances, courts should consider com-
pensation, ownership, and management.8 4 When examining compen-
sation, a court should consider the individual's investment in the firm,
the individual's ownership of firm assets, and the individual's liability
for the firm's debts and obligations.8 5 When assessing ownership, the
court should consider whether the individual's "compensation is
based on the firm's profits."8' 6 Finally, when determining whether a
management right exists, the court should consider the individual's
right to determine how the firm will operate.8 7
Applying these factors to the Serapion case, the First Circuit found
that the plaintiff's status was more akin to that of an employer than an
employee.88 The evidence showed that the plaintiffs compensation
was predicated in substantial measure on the firm's profits; she re-
ceived seventy-five percent of what the four named partners re-
ceived.89 Additionally, the plaintiff served on the firm's executive
committee. 90 The evidence also showed that the plaintiff was "a robust
participant in important policy decisions; for example, the minutes
reflect[ed] that she made several motions [on] the admission of new
partners."91 Given the totality of the circumstances, she was not enti-
tled to employee status because there was no evidence from which a
reasonable finder of fact could conclude that she was anything other
than an equity partner with the meaningful attributes of being a
partner.92
The Sixth, Ninth, and First Circuits correctly rejected the Seventh
Circuit's holding that a partner could not bring a discrimination claim
against a partnership. A partner should be entitled to employee status
if the partner lacks the meaningful attributes of being a partner;93
however, when considering partner discrimination lawsuits, courts
should not focus solely on the common law factors of compensation,
ownership, and control. Instead, courts should focus on whether the
84. Id. at 990.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 992.
89. Id. at 991 n.6.
90. Id. at 992.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 992.
93. Cf Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 n.6 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring)
(explaining that a partnership cannot avoid complying with Title VII by simply labeling
individuals as partners).
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partner has suffered a distinct injury based on the partnership's viola-
tion of federal laws prohibiting workplace discrimination. 94 This ap-
proach will ensure that partnerships comply with federal law
prohibiting workplace discrimination and encourage equity partners
to treat their fellow equity partners fairly.
B. The Status of Lawyer-Shareholders in a Professional
Corporation
The importance of focusing on whether the partner has suffered
a distinct injury based on the partnership's discriminatory conduct is
underscored by the number of law firms electing to operate as profes-
sional corporations, limited liability partnerships, or limited liability
companies. 95 Rather than finding a professional corporation analo-
gous to a partnership, the Supreme Court, in Clackamas Gastroenterol-
ogy Associates, P.C. v. Wells, adopted a new test for determining whether
a professional corporation shareholder falls within the statutory defi-
nition of an employee under laws prohibiting workplace discrimina-
tion.96 In a 7-2 decision resolving a split among the circuits, 97 the
Supreme Court held that whether a shareholder is an employee de-
pends on whether the shareholder is subject to the professional cor-
poration's control. 98 The circuits had developed two tests for
determining whether courts had jurisdiction to hear a discrimination
claim against a professional corporation, each test having dramatically
different results.99
The first test focused on the economic realities of the workplace
rather than the organizational form of the business. Under this test,
courts examined the relationship between the business entity and the
shareholders to determine whether the shareholders were employees.
94. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) ("Congress may grant an express
right of action to persons who would otherwise be barred by prudential standing rules.").
95. In Texas, for example, more than 1,200 law firms, including all of the state's larg-
est firms, elected to become L.L.P.s within one year after the limited liability partnership
act was enacted. Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the
Birth (Nearly), 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 1065, 1065 (1995).
96. 538 U.S. 440 (2003).
97. Id. at 444 n.3.
98. Id. at 468.
99. Id. at 442-44 (following Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d
793 (2d Cir. 1986)). Hyland held that professional corporation shareholders were per se
employees for purposes of laws prohibiting workplace discrimination and refused to follow
EEOCv. Dowd &Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984), which focused on the economic
relationship between the shareholders. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 797-98.
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The leading case using this test was EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd.,'I)( a
Seventh Circuit opinion. In Dowd, the plaintiff brought a Title VII law-
suit against a professional corporation engaged in the practice of
law.' 0 ' Under Tide VII, employers with fewer than fifteen employees
are not required to comply with its provisions. 0 2 In deciding whether
the court had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's discrimination claim,
the Seventh Circuit had to determine whether the professional corpo-
ration had the requisite number of employees. 10 3 The professional
corporation had three attorney-shareholders; if the shareholders were
not counted as employees, the plaintiffs Tide VII claim failed as a
matter of law. 104 The district court dismissed the plaintiff's claim,
holding that the law firm did not have the requisite number of em-
ployees. 105 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that "[t] he role of
a shareholder in a professional corporation is far more analogous to a
partner in a partnership than it is to the shareholder of a general
corporation."' 1 6 The Seventh Circuit stated that " [t] he economic real-
ity of the professional corporation . . . is that the management, con-
trol, and ownership of the corporation is much like the management,
control and ownership of a partnership. ' 10 7 The Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that professional corporation shareholders should not be
treated differently than partners in a partnership. 08 Under this analy-
sis, professional corporation shareholders did not fall within the statu-
tory definition of employees.
The second test placed form over substance in determining
whether professional corporation shareholders and directors were
employees under federal laws prohibiting workplace discrimination.
Under this test, the decision to incorporate made shareholders and
directors per se employees.' 0 9 Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Associates,
P. C.'10 was the leading case that held that shareholders were employ-
ees for purposes of laws prohibiting workplace discrimination. In Hy-
land, the plaintiff, an officer and director of a professional
corporation engaged in the practice of medicine, sued the corpora-
100. 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984).
101. Id.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
103. Dowd & Dowd, 736 F.2d at 1178.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986).
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tion, alleging violations of the ADEA.11 1 The plaintiff averred that he
was forced to resign as an employee, officer, and director because he
was fifty-one years of age. 112 The district court granted the corpora-
tion's motion for summary judgment.' 13 The district court found that,
despite calling itself a corporation, the corporation was a de facto
partnership. 1 4 As such, the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue his age
discrimination claim because a partner is not an employee. 12 5 The
Second Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the district court
erred as a matter of law in applying the "economic realities" test.116
Instead, the court held that because the doctors chose to incorporate
as a professional corporation, the aggrieved shareholder had standing
as an employee to bring an ADEA claim.11 7 The Second Circuit ac-
knowledged the generally accepted principle that "the benefits of the
antidiscrimination statutes ... do not extend to those who properly
are classified as partners[,]" 1 1 8 but found that individuals who make
"the election to incorporate ... should not now be heard to say that
their corporation is 'essentially a medical partnership among co-equal
radiologists."' 1 9 Thus, under this analysis, professional corporation
shareholders fell within the statutory definition of employee.
In Wells, the Supreme Court resolved this split among the circuits
but refused to adopt either test.120 Instead, the Supreme Court re-
quired courts to consider several factors in determining whether a
shareholder should be counted as an employee when trying to decide
if the professional corporation has the requisite number of employees
to trigger application of laws prohibiting workplace discrimination. 1 21
The Wells plaintiff sued the defendant, a professional corporation en-
gaged in the practice of medicine, under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act1 22 ("ADA").123 Employers with fewer than fifteen employees
111. Id. at 794; 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2000).
112. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 794.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 794, 798.
117. Id. at 798.
118. Id. at 797.
119. Id. at 798 (quoting affidavit in support of defendant's motion for summary
judgment).
120. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449 (2003).
121. Id. at 450.
122. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 330 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
123. Wells, 538 U.S. at 442.
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are not required to comply with the ADA.12 4 The Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the shareholders should be considered employees for
purposes of this exception. 25 The ADA only applied in Wells if the
four physician-shareholders fell within the statutory definition of "em-
ployee."' 26 Like Title VII, the ADA defines "employee" as an "individ-
ual employed by an employer." 12 7 The defendant moved for summary
judgment, arguing that it did not have the required number of em-
ployees to trigger the ADA's application because the physician-share-
holders were analogous to partners. 128 The physicians exercised full
control over the medical practice, shared the practice's profits, and
were jointly and severally liable for medical malpractice claims. 129
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment. 3 0 Applying the "economic realities" test, the district court
looked beyond the organizational form of the medical practice and
focused on whether the shareholders held an ownership interest in
the practice, received profit-based compensation, and possessed the
right to control and manage the practice.' 3 ' The district court con-
cluded that the shareholders were analogous to partners in a partner-
ship. 13 2 Thus, the defendant did not have the requisite number of
employees to trigger the ADA's application. 133
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that "the use of the corpo-
rate form, including a professional corporation, 'precludes any exami-
nation designed to determine whether the entity is in fact a
partnership.' "' 134 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the physicians
could not "reap the tax and civil liability advantages" of incorporation
and at the same time argue that they were analogous to partners in a
partnership "to avoid liability for unlawful discrimination." 135 The
Ninth Circuit followed the Second Circuit, which held that profes-
sional corporation shareholders were barred from asserting that they
124. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2000).
125. Wells, 538 U.S. at 443.
126. Id. at 442.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4).
128. Wells, 538 U.S. at 442.
129. Id. at 451.
130. Id. at 442.
131. Id. (citing EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 442.
134. Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C., 271 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir.
2001) (quoting Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir.
1986)).
135. Id.
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were partners. 13 6 The Ninth Circuit found that the shareholders were
referred to as employees under their employment agreements with
the professional corporation. Based on the decision to incorporate
and the employment agreements, "'any inquiry respecting partner-
ship status [was] irrelevant.' "137
The Supreme Court rejected both tests and adopted the guide-
lines that the EEOC uses to determine whether a partner is an em-
ployee. Using the same test, the Supreme Court concluded that
whether a professional corporation shareholder is an employee de-
pends upon whether a professional corporation controls the means
and manner of the shareholder's performance or whether the share-
holder acts independently and participates in the management of the
professional corporation. 1 38 Under Wells, courts are to consider the
following factors in determining whether a shareholder is an
employee:
(1) Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set
the rules and regulations of the individual's work;
(2) Whether, and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises
the individual's work;
(3) Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the
organization;
(4) Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to in-
fluence the organization;
(5) Whether the parties intended that the individual be an em-
ployee, as expressed in written agreements and contracts; and
(6) Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and liabili-
ties of the organization. 139
Under the control test, neither the individual's label nor the em-
ployment agreement is outcome determinative. 140 Instead, the focus is
on the relationship between the parties and the enterprise.14 1 In
adopting the EEOC guidelines, the Supreme Court relied on the com-
mon law test used to determine master-servant relationships. 42 Under
this test, whether a person is a servant depends upon the master's con-
trol of the person in the performance of the person's duties for the
master. 143 Consistent with common law principles of agency, the Su-
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting Hyland, 794 F.2d at 798).
138. Wells, 538 U.S. at 449-50.
139. Id. (quoting BNA, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 2, at
605:0009 (2002)).
140. Id. at 450.
141. Id. at 451.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 448.
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preme Court recognized that the determination of whether a share-
holder is an employee should be made on a case by case basis. 144
Thus, a court should not count a professional corporation share-
holder as an employee if the shareholder operates independently and
manages the corporation. 145 The Supreme Court remanded, requir-
ing the district court to apply the new test and make evidentiary find-
ings to determine whether the shareholders were subject to the
professional corporation's control. 146
Under the control test, non-equity partners will be entitled to
bring discrimination claims against a partnership because their com-
pensation is not based on the firm's profits, they do not have an own-
ership interest in the firm, and they lack a meaningful voice in firm
management. The control test, however, does not address whether eq-
uity partners are entitled to bring discrimination claims against their
partnerships. The Wells decision affects those situations in which
courts are trying to determine whether small professional corpora-
tions engaged in the practice of medicine, law, or accounting are sub-
ject to federal laws prohibiting workplace discrimination. Courts,
however, should not apply Wells in such a way as to ignore Congress's
mandate to eliminate discrimination in the workplace.
C. The Elimination of Workplace Discrimination
Allowing equity partners to pursue discrimination claims if they
are victims of unlawful workplace discrimination is consistent with
Congress's intent to eliminate workplace discrimination. Neither Title
VII's plain language nor its legislative history suggest that Congress
intended professionals, such as lawyers, doctors, or accountants, to
work in sexually or racially hostile environments. 147 An equity law
partner should be entitled to employee status when pursuing a dis-
crimination claim against her law firm because Congress enacted
144. Id. at 450 n.10.
145. Id. at 449.
146. Id. at 451.
147. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986); Rogers v. EEOC, 454
F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1972) (explaining that Title VII's language shows that "Congress
chose neither to enumerate specific discriminatory practices, nor to elucidate in extenso
the parameters of such nefarious activities... knowing that constant change is the order of
our day and that seemingly reasonable practices of the present can easily become the injus-
tices of the morrow"); Pub. L. No. 102-166, tit. II, 105 Stat. 1081 (1991) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000)) (finding that women and minorities are under-
represented in business management and decision-making).
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these laws to eliminate workplace discrimination.148 Determining
whether an equity partner should be entitled to protection under fed-
eral laws prohibiting workplace discrimination requires a two-step pro-
cess.' 49 The first step is to examine the text of the pertinent statute. 50
If the text of the statute unambiguously discloses Congress's intent in
enacting the statute, then the inquiry ends.' 5' If, however, the statute
is ambiguous or silent on the issue, the second step is to construe the
statute's words together with the surrounding circumstances, taking
care not to insert what Congress omitted or omit what Congress
inserted. 152
It is a well-established principle that partnerships are subject to
laws that prohibit workplace discrimination. 53 Title VII prohibits an
employer from discriminating against an employee on the basis of
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' 54 It defines an em-
ployer as a "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who
has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year."' 5 5
The statutory definition of person includes a partnership.1 56 Thus, Ti-
dle VII applies to partnership decisions if those decisiofis are based on
statutorily impermissible reasons.157
In Hishon v. King & Spalding, the Supreme Court addressed
whether an associate could bring a Title VII action against a partner-
ship that was engaged in the practice of law. 158 The plaintiff-associate
148. H.R. REP. No. 914, pt. 2, at 18 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2393.
The House Report states:
No bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the causes and consequences
of racial and other types of discrimination against minorities. There is reason to
believe, however, that the national leadership provided by the enactment of
[fiederal legislation dealing with the most troublesome problems will create an
atmosphere conducive to voluntary or local resolution of other forms of
discrimination.
Id.
149. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
150. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992).
151. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
152. See Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (2000) (stating that person includes a partnership); Hishon
v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 74-75 (1984) (finding that nothing in the statute or the
legislative history supports the argument that partnerships are exempt from federal laws
prohibiting workplace discrimination).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
155. Id. § 2000e(b).
156. Id. § 2000e(a).
157. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 78-79.
158. Id. at 71.
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alleged that the law firm violated Title VII because it refused to pro-
mote her from associate to partner on account of her sex. 159 The dis-
trict court dismissed the associate's law suit, holding that the
associate's complaint failed, as a matter of law, because Title VII did
not apply to partnership promotions. 160 The Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed,' 61 but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 162 It held
that the district court erred in dismissing the associate's complaint
because the allegations were sufficient to state a cognizable claim
under Title VII. 163 The Supreme Court reasoned that compensation,
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment include the opportu-
nity to become a partner; therefore, partnership promotions cannot
be based on an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin. 164 The Supreme Court found that the associate's allegations, if
proved at trial, were sufficient to show that the opportunity to become
a partner was a term, condition, or privilege of the associate's employ-
ment contract; therefore, "partnership consideration must be [made]
without regard to [the associate's] sex."' 165
While Title VII prohibits partnerships from engaging in work-
place discrimination, it does not expressly address whether a partner
is entitled to the remedial provisions of the statute when the partner-
ship engages in discriminatory conduct against individual partners.
Section 2000e (f) of Title VII defines an employee as "an individual
employed by an employer," a definition that provides very little assis-
tance in determining who is entitled to enforce Title VII's remedial
provisions. 166 Because Title VII does not expressly define the term
"employee," it is presumed that Congress intended courts to use the
common law agency definition of "employee."1 67 Under common law
agency principles, a partner can be an employee within the statutory
definition of section 2000e(f) because a partner is a servant of the
partnership if the partner "is in active management of the [partner-
ship] business or is otherwise regularly employed in the [partnership]
business."168
159. Id. at 72-73.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 79.
163. Id. at 76.
164. Id. at 75.
165. Id. at 76.
166. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2000); Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir.
1997) (stating the definition of employee is "a turn of phrase which chases its own tail").
167. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 445 (2003).
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14A (1958).
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This interpretation is consistent with the enforcement provision
of Title VII. Section 2000e-5(f) (1) states that "a civil action may be
brought against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person
claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by a member of
the Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved
by the unlawful employment practice." 169 Under principles of federal
jurisprudence, to qualify as an aggrieved person, a plaintiff must be a
member of a protected class for whom Congress enacted the stat-
ute. 170 It therefore follows that an equity partner should be able to
state a discrimination claim against a partnership if the partnership
singles out the equity partner for adverse employment action because
of the equity partner's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.171
The primary purpose of Title VII was to create a work environment
"free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult."' 72 The
legislative history of Title VII suggests that Congress wanted to remedy
the effects of discrimination in the workplace. 173 Congress believed
that Title VII would eliminate the artificial barriers that "prevented
[African-Americans] from securing jobs with a future."' 74
169. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (emphasis added).
170. The Supreme Court has yet to address whether a Title VII plaintiff must satisfy
both Article III and prudential standing requirements. Nevertheless, Article III requires
the plaintiff to allege and prove that (1) the plaintiff suffered actual or threatened harm;
(2) the defendant's illegal conduct caused the plaintiff harm; and (3) ajudgment in favor
of the plaintiff will redress the harm. SeeLinda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973);
Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979).
171. Cf Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 77-78 (1984) (noting that if Congress
wanted to exempt partnership decisions from the provisions of Title VII, it would have
expressly granted the partnership immunity from the Act's requirements). Adverse em-
ployment action includes "a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing,
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a significant change in benefits." Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,
761 (1998).
172. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
173. The primary goal of Tide VII was the integration of African-Americans into the
economic mainstream of American society. 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964). Senator
Humphrey recognized that African-Americans were relegated to "unskilled and semi-
skilled jobs." Id. at 7379-80. When Congress enacted Title VII, the nonwhite unemploy-
ment rate was approximately 124 percent higher than the white unemployment rate. Id. at
7204. Congress saw employment discrimination as a social malaise and a social situation
that the Nation should not tolerate. Id.
174. Congress clearly intended to eliminate barriers that were preventing African-
Americans from succeeding in the workplace. Id.
What good does it do a Negro to be able to eat in a fine restaurant if he cannot
afford to pay the bill? What good does it do him to be accepted in a hotel that is
too expensive for his modest income? How can a Negro child be motivated to
take full advantage of integrated educational facilities if he has no hope of getting
a job where he can use that education?
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Congress believed that the solution to eliminating the artificial
barriers was to "to open employment opportunities to [African-Ameri-
cans] in occupations that had been traditionally closed to them."' 75
Congress further believed that the enactment of federal legislation
dealing with workplace discrimination would "create an atmosphere
conducive to voluntary or local resolution of other forms of discrimi-
nation."1 76 Likewise, when Congress amended the Civil Rights Act, it
found that artificial barriers continued to prevent women and minori-
ties from holding management and decision-making positions in busi-
ness. 1 7 7 It is, therefore, logical to conclude that Congress intended to
provide unlimited access to statutory remedies to anyone who needed
protection from workplace abuses, provided the employer did not fall
within the small business exemption to the statute.1 78
Id. at 6547.
Without a job, one cannot afford public convenience and accommodations. In-
come from employment may be necessary to further a [person's] education, or
that of his [or her] children. If [the person's] children have no hope of getting a
good job, what will motivate them to take advantage of educational
opportunities?
Id. at 6552 (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
175. Id. at 6548.
176. H.R. Rep. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 18 (1963), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2393.
177. In 1991, when Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress found
that "despite a dramatically growing presence in the workplace, women and minorities
remained underrepresented in management and decision-making positions in business,"
and artificial barriers continued to prevent employment opportunities for women and mi-
norities. Glass Ceiling Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). Title VII's legislative history,
at both the time of its enactment and amendment, clearly indicates Congress's intent that
federal law eradicate invidious forms of discrimination that pollute the American work-
place. Under the Glass Ceiling Act, Congress created a commission to study the causes
preventing women and minorities from obtaining management and decision-making posi-
tions and determine what could be done to eliminate any artificial barriers preventing
advancement. Creation of the Glass Ceiling Commission, 57 Fed. Reg. 10,776, 10,777 (Mar.
30, 1992).
178. As Justice O'Connor stated during the Wells oral argument, Congress intended
Title VII's small business exemption to apply to "really small businesses." Transcript of
Justice O'Connor's Questions, Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S.
440 (2003) (No. 01-1435), 2003 WL 840129, at *19. See Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d
937 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that Congress intended "to spare very small firms from the
potentially crushing expense of mastering the intricacies of antidiscrimination laws, estab-
lishing procedures to assure compliance, and defending against suits when efforts at com-
pliance fail"). Similarly, courts should assess whether the law firm falls within the small
business exemption. For example, a partner should not be able to sue the law firm under
Title VII if the firm is a small partnership with each partner having equal rights in the
control and management of the firm or if an executive committee or managing partner
does not exercise primary control over partnership decisions.
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Based on Congress's intent in enacting Title VII, courts should
liberally construe these provisions to protect the victims of workplace
discrimination and strictly construe exceptions that would undermine
their application.179 A narrow interpretation of the term "employee"
that excludes equity partners who are the victims of unlawful work-
place discrimination is inconsistent with a statute that allows any ag-
grieved person to enforce it.18° Thus, a partner should be included in
the statutory definition of "employee" based on the partner's status as
an aggrieved person.
H. Partners Without Power Are Entitled to Pr'otection From
Discrimination
The traditional partnership structure in which the partners make
decisions through common agreement or consent no longer exists in
many law firms today. 18 ' In Hishon, Justice Powell acknowledged the
unique relationship among law firm partners who are responsible for
the distribution of profits, compensation, promotion, collections, and
the effective and ethical representation of clients.18 2 In his concurring
opinion, Justice Powell stated that "[t] he relationship among law part-
ners contemplates that decisions important to the partnership nor-
mally will be made by common agreement. .. or consent among the
partners.' 8 3 For a number of reasons, however, most law firms have
abandoned traditional partnerships as the basis for their organiza-
tion's structure.' 8 4 First, a growing trend is for law firms to have two
types of partners: equity and non-equity.18 5 Non-equity partners do
not have an ownership interest in the firm or a vote in how the firm
operates.'8 6 "A decade ago, only a dozen of the top firms had two-
179. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 446 n.6
(2003); EEOC v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass'n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir. 1982)
("When interpreting the term 'employee' in social welfare legislation such as the ADEA,
Title VII, the Fair Labor Standards Act and the National Labor Relations Act, courts have
used a broad definition so as to effectuate the stated purposes of these Acts.").
180. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 125 (1995).
181. Adams & Albert, supra note 52, at 1133 (citing William H. Rehnquist, The Legal
Profession Today, 62 IND. L. REv. 151, 156 (1987) (stating that the practice of law has dra-
matically changed and is becoming "more and more like a business")).
182. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 n.3 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 80 (Powell, J., concurring).
184. Hamilton, supra note 95.
185. See Cobb, supra note 6, at 10; Curriden, supra note 7, at 18; Steven T. Taylor,
Beware Wholesale Associate Layoffs, Beware Unproductive Partners, Consider Two Tiers, OF COUN-
SEL, Feb. 2002, at 3.
186. Curriden, supra note 7, at 19.
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tiered partnership tracks. Today, more than half of the nation's 100
largest firms openly boast of such a creature. Legal consultants say
most of the rest have a two-tiered partnership track .... ,,"sv Second, a
number of law firms have abandoned partnerships in favor of profes-
sional corporations. Finally, many large firms delegate management
to a managing partner and an executive committee, which are respon-
sible for overseeing the hiring, firing, promotion, and compensation
of the attorneys in the firm. 188
A. The Control Test and Attorney-Shareholders
The control test as applied in Wells focused on whether a small
professional corporation was an employer under the ADA.189 The Su-
preme Court did not address whether a shareholder could hold a pro-
fessional corporation liable for violating federal laws prohibiting
workplace discrimination. 190 The inevitable consequence of Wells,
however, is that a shareholder will not be able to hold a professional
corporation liable for violating federal laws prohibiting workplace
discrimination even though the professional corporation has the
requisite number of employees, the shareholder is a member of a pro-
tected class, and the shareholder is a victim of unlawful workplace
discrimination.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Schmidt v. Ottawa Medical
Center,19 1 which was decided before Wells, illustrates this principle.
Schmidt held that professional corporation shareholders were not enti-
tled to bring discrimination claims against professional corporations if
they had equal rights to manage the business, their compensation was
based on the business's profits, and they had significant control over
their daily assignments. 19 2 In Schmidt, the plaintiff, a physician-share-
holder in a closely-held professional corporation engaged in the prac-
187. Id.
188. See EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 702-03 (7th Cir. 2002).
See generally Gibbons, supra note 53, at 71 (predicting that as law firms increased in size,
they would centralize management rather than having all partners involved in the decision-
making process).
189. Cf Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449 (2003)
(adopting the EEOC's test for determining whether the shareholder is subject to the cor-
poration's control).
190. During oral argument, Justice O'Connor specifically stated that the Court was
"not looking to see if [the shareholders] themselves [were] covered under the ADA in this
case." Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, No. 01-1435, 2003 Wi. 840129, at
*19 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2003) (oral argument).
191. 322 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2003).
192. See id. at 467.
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tice of medicine, sued the medical center for allegedly violating the
ADEA. 19 3 The district court granted the medical center's motion to
dismiss, finding that the relationship between the plaintiff and the
medical center was analogous to a partnership. 194 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed. 19 5 The evidence showed that the plaintiff was a shareholder
and a director of the medical center.'9 6 He had an equal right to vote
on compensation plans, amendments to the employment agreements,
and the hiring and firing of non-shareholder doctors. 9 7 The plaintiff
received a base salary and was eligible to share in the medical center's
profits. 19 8 The Seventh Circuit concluded that, regardless of whether
it used the "economic realties" test or adhered to common law agency
principles, the plaintiffs "role was akin to that of a bona fide partner-
employer rather than that of an employee."' 9 9 The Seventh Circuit
rejected the plaintiffs argument that he relinquished control over his
employment because his employment agreement vested sole authority
of patient assignment in the medical center's board. 20 0 Rather, the
Seventh Circuit found that the evidence showed that the plaintiffs
"employment agreement vest[ed] in him absolute authority for the
treatment of his patients once assigned to him. Therefore, while [the
plaintiff] may not possess sole authority over the conditions of his em-
ployment . . . , he [did] exercise significant control" over his prac-
tice. 20 ' Thus, the Seventh Circuit ignored the statutory purpose of the
ADEA, which is the elimination of workplace discrimination on the
basis of age. Instead, the Seventh Circuit focused on whether the
plaintiff held the same economic attributes and ownership interest as
a partner in a traditional common law partnership. 20 2
The outcome of whether a shareholder in a large professional
corporation may sue the professional corporation for violating laws
prohibiting workplace discrimination remains the same after the Wells
decision as before it-a court lacks jurisdiction to hear the share-
holder's discrimination claim because the shareholder is not subject
to the control of the professional corporation. Under the control test
193. Id. at 462.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 467.
197. Id. at 462, 467.
198. Id. at 462-63.
199. Id. at 466.
200. Id. at 467.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 466.
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set forth in Wells, courts assess whether a shareholder falls within the
statutory definition of employee by continuing to look at concepts of
compensation, management, and ownership. 20 3 By focusing on these
three factors, professional corporations that do not fall within the
small business exception of laws prohibiting workplace discrimination
may engage in discriminatory conduct against their shareholders with-
out having to consider whether such conduct could withstand scrutiny
under these laws.
B. The Control Test and Non-Equity Partners
Under the control test, non-equity partners are able to hold law
firm partnerships liable for unlawful workplace discrimination. The
Serapion factors of compensation, management, and control are moot
in determining whether a non-equity partner qualifies for Title VII
protection because, by definition and treatment, these partners do
not possess the meaningful attributes of being an equity partner.
Under this system of partnership, associates who become non-equity
partners usually receive an increase in compensation without a right
to share in the firm's profits. 20 4 The professional benefits of being a
non-equity partner include protection from the "risk of [a] lower in-
come[ ] in poor performance years." 20 5 Non-equity partners also re-
ceive the benefit of "being held out to the public and clients as a
partner of the firm." 20 6
The biggest advantage that non-equity partners have over equity
partners, however, is access to the remedial provisions of federal laws
prohibiting workplace discrimination. For example, return to the
story of Abby. Assume Abby's law firm has a two-tiered partnership,
and Abby is a non-equity partner. As a non-equity partner, Abby re-
ceives a guaranteed salary of $150,000. Abby does not own any of the
firm assets, and she is not liable for the firm's debts or obligations.
With respect to her work, Abby has a solid practice and supervises
associates who work with her on cases; however, Abby's ability to ac-
cept new clients or projects is subject to the approval of the firm's
executive committee. Senior partners continue to assign Abby cases to
work on and supervise her work on those cases.
Under the control test, the court has jurisdiction to hear Abby's
Tide VII claim. First, unlike equity partners, Abby's compensation is
203. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 450 (2003).
204. See Curriden, supra note 7, at 18.
205. Cobb, supra note 6, at 11.
206. Id. at 12.
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not based on the firm's profits. Second, Abby does not have an owner-
ship interest in the firm. Third, the partnership controls whether
Abby is able to expand her practice because it determines which cli-
ents she can accept as firm clients and what projects will receive the
firm's stamp of approval. As such, the firm dictates the parameters of
Abby's work. Additionally, Abby does not have absolute authority over
the cases that senior partners assign to her. Finally, and most impor-
tantly, Abby is not entitled to vote on internal firm policy. Even
though Abby is held out to clients and the public as a partner, she
lacks the meaningful attributes of being an equity partner. Thus,
under the control test, Abby falls within Title VII's statutory definition
of employee.
The practical effect of the control test is that the multi-tiered
partnership has consequences beyond "keep [ing] well trained lawyers
who understand the culture and clients of the law firm.120 7 It divides
partners into two classes: those who have access to the remedial provi-
sions of laws prohibiting workplace discrimination and those who
must suffer the consequences of being forced to work in a sexually or
racially hostile environment without legal recourse.
C. The Control Test and Equity Partners
The control test does not have any substantive effect on an equity
partner's ability to bring a Title VII claim against a partnership; equity
partners are forced to work in a hostile environment without legal
recourse. Under the control test, contrary to Congress's intent to
eliminate workplace discrimination, the Serapion factors of compensa-
tion, management, and control remain outcome determinative. After
the Wells decision, the District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois applied the control test to determine whether a partner engaged
in the practice of law was entitled to employee status under Title VII
and the ADEA. 208 In Solon v. Kaplan,20 9 the plaintiff, himself a partner,
sued the individual partners and law firm partnership for allegedly
forcing him out of the law firm "based on his age and because of his
investigation of two sexual harassment incidents."2 10 The district court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.211 It held
that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law be-
207. Id. at 10.
208. Solon v. Kaplan, No. 00 C 2888, 2004 WL 725893, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2004).
209. No. 00 C 2888, 2004 WL 725893 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2004).
210. Id. at *2.
211. Id. at*l.
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cause the evidence showed that the plaintiff was an equity partner. 212
Like the Serapion plaintiff, the Solon plaintiff received a share of the
firm's income, was liable for the firm's debts, individually contributed
capital to the firm, and possessed managerial responsibilities with an
equal vote in how the firm would operate. 213 Thus, the district court
found that there was "no genuine issue as to any material fact that
[the plaintiff] was a partner" and that "no reasonable jury could find
that [the plaintiff] was an employee." 214
As the Solon decision demonstrates, under the control test, equity
partners do not have access to the remedial protections of federal laws
prohibiting workplace discrimination because courts focus on the at-
tributes of being an equity partner and ignore who is entitled to en-
force the provisions of the statute against a respondent for alleged
violations of the law.2 15 Thus, if Abby were an equity partner, she
would not be protected by Title VII; rather, she would be forced to
tolerate Rob's advances.
The control test fails to address a significant question: why should
equity partners or professional corporation shareholders be denied
access to the protection of federal laws prohibiting workplace discrim-
ination where the intent of Congress in passing such laws was to rem-
edy such discrimination? 216
An equity partner should be able to hold her law firm liable for
violating federal laws prohibiting workplace discrimination because
the purpose of these laws is to eliminate discrimination based on im-
mutable characteristics such as sex or race. 217 Further, the legislative
history suggests that Congress intended professionals to have access to
the remedial protection of federal laws prohibiting workplace discrim-
212. Id. at *5.
213. Id. at *4-*5.
214. Id.
215. Compare Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a partner is entitled to employee status if the partner does not possess the meaningful
attributes of being a partner), and Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 988 (1st Cir. 1997)
(holding that a partner is not entitled to employee status if the partner owns and manages
the business and has the right to share in the business's profits), with 42 U.S.C. 2000e-
5(f) (1) (2000) (expressly stating that an aggrieved person has standing to bring a discrimi-
nation claim against the respondent named in the EEOC charge).
216. See EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 702 (7th Cir. 2002)
("Neither party [before the court] addressed why some or all members of the partnership
should . . . be deemed employers and so placed outside the protection of [federal anti-
discrimination] laws.").
217. H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 10 (1963).
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ination.2 18 Without the protection of these laws, however, equity part-
ners do not have any power or control to force their fellow equity
partners to eliminate unlawful employment practices. Contrary to the
control test, an analysis of whether an equity partner may pursue a
discrimination claim against the law firm should focus on (1) whether
the partnership is a de facto corporation, and, ultimately, (2) whether
the partner has the power to force the firm to take remedial action to
eliminate the discrimination. Thus, the critical inquiry should be
whether an equity partner is more akin to a corporate executive be-
cause she has the power to force the firm to take remedial action to
eliminate discrimination or whether the partner is more akin to an
employee, who lacks such power. 219
D. Partnerships as De Facto Corporations
Ownership involves the power to control and the ability of co-
owners to protect themselves from unlawful workplace discrimina-
tion.220 The assessment of whether a partner has the power to control
or eliminate the discrimination should not be based on the right to
share in the firm's profits. Instead, the right to pursue a discrimina-
tion claim should be based on whether the equity partner is a victim
of unlawful workplace discrimination. Courts reason that a partner
should not be allowed to sue a partnership
because partnership law gives [partners] effective remedies against
oppression by their fellow partners, because partnership relations
would be poisoned if partners could sue each other for unlawful
discrimination, and because the relation among partners is so inti-
mate that [partners] should be allowed to discriminate, just as indi-
viduals are allowed to discriminate in their purely personal
relations. 221
218. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1078 (1991)
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e and creating a national commission to study and address
issues preventing women and minorities from obtaining managerial and decision-making
positions in business).
219. Cf 1hAROLD GILL REUSCHCHLEIN, THE L-w OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 250 (2d
ed. 1990) ("Many decisions permit management to be centralized in one partner, or a
small committee of partners. Where this is done, co-ownership is still found to exist fre-
quently but only if other factors are consistent with partnership." (emphasis added)).
220. Schmidt v. Ottawa Medical Ctr., P.C., 322 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2003) ("It is
beyond reproach that both agency law principles and statutory purpose would consider
control over employment opportunities to be a relevant factor [in determining whether a
partner is an employee].").
221. See Sidley Austin, 315 F.3d at 702; Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79
(1984) (Powell, J., concurring) ("The relationship among partners differs markedly from
that between employer-employee-including that between the partnership and
associates.").
[Vol. 39
But even Justice Powell, who believed that equity partners should
not be allowed to bring Title VII actions against their partnerships,
conceded that "'invidious private discrimination . . . has never been
accorded affirmative constitutional protections.' "222
As law firms have abandoned traditional partnership structures
and become larger, the inquiry into whether an equity partner is enti-
tled to protection under laws prohibiting workplace discrimination
should focus on whether the law firm partnership is a de facto corpo-
ration.223 The Seventh Circuit addressed whether a partnership was a
de facto corporation in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood.2 2 4 In that case, the EEOC filed a motion
for entry of an order compelling Sidley Austin to produce documents
relating to the demotion of thirty-two senior equity partners to of
counsel or senior counsel positions.225 The district court entered the
order, and the law firm appealed. 226 The Seventh Circuit vacated and
remanded. 227 The Seventh Circuit held that Sidley Austin was re-
quired to produce documents so the EEOC could determine whether
the ADEA "arguably" protected the demoted partners. 228 The Seventh
Circuit recognized that one of the basic partnership benefits is the
ability of equity partners to protect themselves from the partnership's
unlawful discriminatory acts. 229 The Seventh Circuit was concerned
that in some partnership settings, such as the one before it, partners
were defenseless without any power or control over their fates.
230
222. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 78 (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973)).
223. "'A de facto corporation is an apparent corporate organization asserted to be a
corporation by its members and actually existing as such, but lacking the creative fiat of
that State.'" Di Francesco v. Kennedy, 160 A. 72 (Conn. 1932) (citation omitted); see also
Sidley Austin, 315 F.3d at 702-03 (finding that the law firm had more than 500 partners but
that all the power resided in thirty-six members of a committee); REUSCHCHLEIN, supra note
219. Courts consider the following factors in determining whether a corporate officer or
director is entitled to employee status under laws prohibiting workplace discrimination:
(1) whether a separate entity regularly employs the corporate officer or director; (2)
whether the director has traditional employee duties and responsibilities; and (3) whether
the director reports to someone higher in the organization. EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins,
Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1539 (2d Cir. 1996).
224. 315 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002).
225. Id. at 698.
226. Id. at 699.
227. Id. at 707.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 704 (stating that the basis for exempting partners from ADEA coverage is
the presumption that "partners ordinarily have adequate remedies under partnership law
to protect themselves against oppression (including age or other forms of invidious dis-
crimination) by the partnership").
230. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that Sidley Austin was a part-
nership. 231 But the Seventh Circuit stated the "question is whether,
when a firm employs the latitude allowed to it by state law to recon-
figure a partnership in the direction of making it a de facto corpora-
tion, a federal agency enforcing federal antidiscrimination law is
compelled to treat all the 'partners' as employees." 232 The Seventh
Circuit compared the Sidley Austin partnership characteristics to
those of a general corporation and found them substantially the
same. 2 33 Under partnership law, a partner may contractually bind the
partnership. Likewise, the "employees of a corporation, when acting
within the scope of their employment, regularly commit the corpora-
tion to contractual undertakings, not to mention tort liability. ' 23 4 A
partner is also entitled to share in the firm's profits; similarly, "many
corporations base their employees' compensation in part anyway, but
sometimes in very large part, on the corporation's profits, without any-
one supposing them employers."235 The fact that a partner serves on
administrative committees for the partnership "does not distinguish
them from executive employees in corporations. Corporations have
committees and the members of the committees are [corporate] em-
ployees. ' 236 Finally, a partner has an ownership interest in the partner-
ship; however, executive-level employees can also have an ownership
interest in the corporation based on their ownership of corporate
stock.237
The most significant difference between a Sidley Austin partner
and a corporate employee is that the Sidley Austin partner has unlim-
ited liability for the firm's debts, but "[i] s that enough to pin the part-
ner tail on the donkey?" 23 8 In deciding whether a partnership is a de
facto corporation, the Seventh Circuit suggested that whether the de-
moted partners were nothing more than corporate employees de-
pended, in part, on whether the partnership profits were "so
concentrated in members of the executive committee, or in some
smaller or larger set of partners, in relation to the profits that the
executive committee allocated to [the demoted partners] . ' 239 A
231. Id. at 702.
232. Id. at 705.
233. Id. at 702-03.
234. Id. at 703.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 707.
[Vol. 39
LAW FIRM PARTNERS AND DISCRIMINATION
court's examination of whether a partnership is a de facto corporation
should not stop at compensation. Instead, the court should consider
the EEOC guidelines that the Supreme Court adopted in Wells. A
court should also consider whether the amount of control exercised
by the equity partner is diluted by the size or structure of the firm and
whether the equity partner lacks the power to eliminate the discrimi-
nation because the equity partner does not have the ability to make or
affect internal firm policy.2 40
Traditionally, when presented with small partnerships, courts
held that partners were not entitled to protection under federal laws
prohibiting workplace discrimination. 241 But, in a large partnership, a
partner's vote does not provide her with the ability to protect herself
from discrimination. 242 In a small partnership, each partner has the
ability to block adverse partnership decisions by combining her votes
with another partner.243 But in a large partnership, a partner controls
"a minute fraction" of the partnership votes.244 In large partnerships,
the inability to affect internal firm policy makes the partner more akin
to an employee than an employer because the majority rules structure
leaves the equity partner a defenseless victim of unlawful workplace
discrimination. 245 Thus, an equity partner should be entitled to the
protection of laws prohibiting workplace discrimination if the equity
partner can show that the size of the partnership precluded her from
eliminating the discrimination because she controlled only a "minute
fraction" of the partnership votes.
240. See Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 867-68 (9th Cir.
1996).
241. Compare Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., 925 F.2d 1398, 1399 (11th Cir. 1991)
(finding that the shareholder was one of four shareholders in the firm), EEOC v. Dowd &
Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1179 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding that the professional corporation
had only three shareholders), and Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977) (find-
ing that the partnership had four partners), with Sidley Austin, 315 F.3d 696 (finding that
the partnership had 500 partners), and Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir.
1996) (finding that the plaintiff was a partner in one of the largest professional partner-
ships in the world), Aruso v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 664 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (finding that the partnership had 1,350 partners), and Jones v. Baskin, Flaherty,
Elliott & Mannino, 670 F. Supp. 597, 601-02 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that an attorney-
shareholder was an employee because the evidence showed that the professional corpora-
tion was a large law firm with offices in several cities and with a board of directors who
managed the firm).
242. See Strother, 79 F.3d at 868.
243. See Caruso, 664 F. Supp. at 149.
244. See Erhlich v. Howe, 848 F. Supp. 482, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
245. See Strother, 79 F.3d at 867-68.
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II. Protecting Equity Partners from Partnership
Discrimination
The term "employee" should have two different meanings de-
pending upon the context in which it is used. Courts should liberally
construe employee to include an equity partner or shareholder when
determining whether partnerships or professional corporations that
do not fall within the small business exception to Title VII have alleg-
edly engaged in impermissible employment actions. 246
This approach will prevent the inequitable result that occurred in
Ballen-Stier v. Hahn & Hessen, L.L.P.247 In Ballen-Stier, the plaintiff, an
equity partner, sued the law firm for violations of Title VII that oc-
curred while she was an associate. 248 She alleged that the defendant,
one of her partners, created a hostile and abusive work environment
based on his relentless sexual harassment that began while the plain-
tiff was an associate and continued after she became a partner. 249 The
New York Appellate Division held that the plaintiff could hold the law
firm liable for discriminatory acts that occurred while she was an asso-
ciate; however, her status as an equity partner barred her from hold-
ing the firm liable for discriminatory acts that occurred while she was
a partner. 250 To avoid the outcome in Ballen-Stier, courts should focus
on the enforcement provision of Tide VII rather than the plaintiffs
status as an equity partner.
Allowing a partnership to discriminate against an equity partner
based on the partner's race, sex, religion, age, disability, or national
origin undermines the primary purpose of federal laws prohibiting
workplace discrimination. 251 It is also contrary to the national policy
of preventing and eliminating unlawful employment practices. 252
Courts should not interpret federal laws prohibiting workplace dis-
crimination so as to allow law firms to ignore congressional and na-
246. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 446 n.6 (2003)
(noting that courts should liberally construe the term "employee" to effectuate Congress's
intent of eliminating workplace discrimination under the ADA).
247. 727 N.Y.S.2d 421 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
248. Id. at 422.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971). The goal of Title VII is to
"achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in
the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees." Id. at
429-30. "What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unneces-
sary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classification." Id. at 431.
252. H.R. REP. No. 88-914 (1963).
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tional mandates to end workplace discrimination. 253 Holding law firm
partnerships liable for discriminating against equity partners will en-
courage law firms to comply with federal laws prohibiting workplace
discrimination. 254 Thus, an equity partner should be entitled to pur-
sue a discrimination claim against a law firm if the law firm failed to
exercise reasonable care to prevent and correct the illegal discrimina-
tory conduct.255
While the control test may be helpful in determining whether the
firm has a sufficient number of employees to give the court subject
matterjurisdiction, it is insufficient for determining whether an equity
partner or shareholder has standing to sue the law firm for violating a
federal statute prohibiting workplace discrimination.
256
A. Keeping Pace with the New Partnership-Partner Protection
Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act
In determining whether an equity partner has standing to en-
force the provisions of a particular statute prohibiting workplace dis-
crimination, courts should focus on whether the equity partner is a
member of a protected class, whether the equity partner has per-
formed satisfactorily, whether the equity partner has suffered an ad-
verse employment decision, and whether equity partners who are not
members of a protected class received preferential treatment. 257 This
approach is consistent with Congress's intent to eliminate unlawful
employment practices that prevent women and minorities from en-
joying the benefits of a workplace free from discrimination. 258 It is
also consistent with current principles of partnership law.
In 1986, seventy-two years after the National Conference of Com-
missioners on United States laws proposed the UPA, an American Bar
253. Cf Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (reasoning that courts
should interpret "employee" to include former as well as current employees because a
more narrow construction would undermine the primary purpose of Title VII).
254. ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN, supra note 38, at 19-21.
255. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998).
256. ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN, supra note 38, at 20 (explaining that, while unlawful
harassment persists in legal workplaces, most victims refuse to take action because they fear
ridicule or retaliation).
257. Compare MeNtor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986) (holding
that a plaintiff may recover non-economic damages for injuries from having to work in a
sexually hostile environment), with Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99
(1979) ("In order to satisfy Art. III, the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defen-
dant."). See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1976).
258. See supra notes 173-79.
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Association subcommittee recommended that the Commissioners re-
vise the UPA to reflect changes in how partnerships operate.259 In
1992, the Commissioners proposed the Revised Uniform Partnership
Act2 60 ("RUPA"). The RUPA expressly recognizes that a partnership
has an independent legal identity distinct from the partners.2 61 Under
the RUPA, a partner may sue the partnership in law and at equity.262
Section 405 states that a partner may maintain an action against the
partnership or another partner, such as an accounting as to partner-
ship business, to enforce a right under the RUPA, including sections
401, 403, and 404.263 Section 404 requires the partnership and its part-
ners to "refrain from engaging in .. . a knowing violation of law." 264
Thus, under the entity theory and the RUPA, a partner may sue the
partnership if, like any other person subject to laws prohibiting work-
place discrimination, the partnership knew of the discrimination and
failed to take remedial action to eliminate it.
A partnership is also vicariously liable for torts that a partner
commits in the course and scope of the partnership's business or with
the authority of her fellow partners. 265 A partnership's calculated inac-
tion to a partner's complaint of discrimination contemplates a know-
ing acceptance of a violation of federal law.2 66 Because federal and
state laws prohibit workplace discrimination based on immutable
characteristics, it would be a "striking limitation" of those laws to allow
partners to ignore their requirements and freely discriminate against
each other.26 7 Thus, courts should allow equity partners to pursue dis-
crimination claims against their law firms if the other partners knew of
and acquiesced to, or subsequently condoned, the discriminatory
conduct.2 68
259. See Report, Should the Uniform Partnership Act Be Revised?, 43 Bus. L. REv. 121, 123
(1987).
260. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIp ACr, 6 U.L.A. 1 (1997).
261. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP AcT § 7 cmt (1997); REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 201 cmt.
(1997 and Supp. 1998) ("RUPA embraces the entity theory."). Thirty-one states have
adopted some form of the RUPA. J. WILLIAM CiLISON, PARTNERSHIP LAw & PRACTICE § 1.1
n.13 (2003).
262. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 405(b) (2) (i) (1997).
263. Id.
264. Id. § 404(c) (1997).
265. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 41, §1.01, at 1-11.
266. See Ponticelli v. Zurich Am. Ins. Group, 16 F. Supp. 2d 414, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
267. See McKinney v. Nat'l Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108, 1121 (D. Mass. 1980)
(stating that "it would be a striking limitation of the scope of the implied covenant [of
good faith and fair dealing]" to allow partnerships to discriminate against partners).
268. It is a well-established principle of partnership law to impute notice to one partner
to all of the other partners. UNIF. P'SHIp ACT OF 1914 § 12, 6 U.L.A. 275 (2001). See NLRB
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B. Equity Partners and Standing
An equity partner should have standing to pursue a discrimina-
tion claim against the law firm because Congress granted a private
right of action to any person who satisfies both Article 111269 and pru-
dential requirements. 270 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdic-
tion,271 meaning that under Article III federal courts may hear only
those disputes that the Constitution and Congress authorize them to
hear.272 Even if federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction to hear
the dispute, Article III limits their jurisdiction to deciding only actual
cases or controversies. 273 This limitation requires federal courts to de-
termine whether the plaintiff has standing to pursue her cause of ac-
tion in federal court.274 Thus, as a threshold matter, federal courts
must decide "whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant [the] invocation of
federal-court jurisdiction. '"2 7 5
To satisfy Article III standing requirements, equity partners must
show that they "suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
putatively illegal conduct" and that a favorable decision is likely to re-
dress the harm. 2 76 To satisfy prudential standing requirements, a
plaintiff must show that the constitutional or statutory provision on
which the plaintiff bases her claim grants persons in the plaintiffs po-
sition a right to the requested judicial relief.27 7 Courts consider the
following factors in determining whether the plaintiff can meet her
prudential burden of proof: (1) whether the injury "fall [s] within the
zone of interests protected by the law invoked"; (2) whether the plain-
tiff is asserting her own legal rights or interests; and (3) whether the
injury is specific or confined to a distinct group.278 Thus, an equity
v. Broad St. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 452 F.2d 302, 304 n.1 (3d Cir. 1971); Friend v. H.A. Friend
& Co., 416 F.2d 526, 533 (9th Cir. 1969).
269. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
270. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2000).
271. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
272. Compare Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 695-97 (1992) (explaining that
Article III, Section 2 gives federal courts their power to resolve disputes), with Finely v.
United States, 490 U.S. 545, 547-48 (1989) (stating that a plaintiff's claim must satisfy both
Article III requirements and fall under a federal statute for a federal court to exercise
jurisdiction over the matter).
273. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
274. Id. at 518.
275. Id. at 498.
276. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
277. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500.
278. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
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partner should be able to satisfy the standing requirements for Title
VII if the firm singled out the partner for adverse employment action
based on the partner's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
279
Title VII grants a private right of action for "[a] person claiming
to be aggrieved.., by [an] alleged unlawful employment practice. 280
The Supreme Court interprets the phrase "person adversely affected
or aggrieved" as a term of art used to identify those plaintiffs who have
suffered an actual injury at the hands of the defendant and those who
seek to vindicate an interest that "is arguably within the 'zone of inter-
ests to be protected or regulated by the statute' in question."281 Unlike
the term employee, Congress specifically invoked a term of art to de-
fine who could bring a claim under Title VII. 28 2
In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,288 the Supreme
Court explained the statutory effect of the congressional use of a term
of art.28 4 In that case, the Supreme Court compared Title VII to Title
VIII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination in
housing.28 5 Both statutes use the phrase "aggrieved person." 28 6 In Ti-
de VIII, Congress defined the phrase "aggrieved person" as "any per-
son who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing
practice." 2 7 In looking at Title VIII's legislative history, the Supreme
Court stated that Congress intended the Act to apply to individuals
"who were not the direct objects of discrimination [but who] had an
interest in ensuring fair housing, as they too suffered [from such dis-
criminatory conduct] .288
279. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
280. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2000).
281. Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co., 514 U.S. 122, 127 (1995) (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)).
282. See id. at 126.
283. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
284. Id. at 209-11.
285. Id. at 209.
286. Id. at 206 n.1, 209.
287. Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i) (1) (2000); Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 208
(holding that Congress intended apartment dwellers to have a private right of action
against one whose conduct violates the statute). Under Title VIII, a white tenant has stand-
ing to assert the rights of African-American renters. Section 3602(i) (1) gives apartment
dwellers a private right of action "to be free from the adverse consequences flowing to
them from racially discriminatory rental practices directed at third parties." Gladstone, Realtors v.
Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 121-22 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
288. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 210 (citations omitted); Childress v. City of Richmond, 134
F.3d 1205, 1210 n.3 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Luttig, J., concurring) (stating there is
nothing in legislative history of Title VII like that in Title VIII that indicates "Congress
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On the other hand, Title VII does not define "aggrieved person."
In the absence of a statutory definition, courts should assume that
Congress intended to incorporate the term of art definition for the
meaning of the phrase. 28 9 Congress's decision not to include a statu-
tory definition of the phrase indicates that Congress intended anyone
who was a victim of discrimination to have access to the remedial pro-
visions of the Act. It follows, therefore, that a partner falls within the
statutory definition of "aggrieved person" under Title VII if the equity
partner is subject to unlawful workplace discrimination. 29° As such, an
equity partner falls within the statutory definition of "employee" if the
equity partner is directly affected by conduct that Title VII expressly
prohibits.291
C. Substantive Burdens of Proof in Partner Discrimination Claims
Courts should apply the traditional McDonnell Douglas three-part
burden shifting analysis to determine whether an equity partner is an
aggrieved person under federal laws prohibiting workplace discrimi-
nation.2 92 Under the McDonnell Douglas test, the initial burden of pro-
duction is on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. The burden then shifts to the defendant to show a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its action. Upon such a show-
ing, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defen-
dant's stated reason is a pretext and not the real reason for the
defendant's action.293
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York used the McDonnell Douglas test to decide whether an at-will
shareholder was entitled to bring a Title VII claim against a profes-
sional corporation engaged in the practice of law when the share-
holder alleged that he was terminated based on his interracial
intended to broaden the scope of 'aggrieved' persons beyond those directly victimized by
unlawful employment discrimination").
289. See Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 126 (1995) (explaining that "aggrieved person" is a term of art
used to designate who has standing to pursue a judicial remedy in federal court).
290. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) ("[A] plaintiff may
establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a
hostile or abusive work environment.").
291. Cf REVISED UNIF. P'SHIp Acr § 404(c) (1997) (stating that each partner has a duty
to refrain from engaging in a knowing violation of law).
292. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
293. Id. at 802-04.
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marriage to an African-American woman. 29 4 The defendant moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff failed to satisfactorily
perform his employment duties.295 The district court held that the
plaintiff satisfied his burden of showing that (1) he was a member of a
protected class based on his interracial marriage; (2) he "satisfactorily
performed his duties and was qualified for his position"; (3) the plain-
tiff suffered an adverse employment action because he was "termi-
nated from his employment"; and (4) although the plaintiff was not
replaced by someone who was not a member of a protected class, "he
satisfied the requisite showing of preference for someone outside the
protected class" in that he was treated differently than non-protected
class members.296
The district court also held that the defendant met its burden of
articulating non-discriminatory reasons for the termination.29 7 The
district court further held that the plaintiff met his burden of showing
that the reasons for the termination were pretextual based on, among
other things, the fact that "the defendant's state of mind regarding
the race of [the] plaintiff's wife" was a question of fact for the jury.29 8
Thus, equity partners may satisfy their burden of proof by showing
that the partnership singled them out for adverse treatment based on
the partner's race, color, sex, religion, and national origin and by
presenting evidence from which a reasonable person could conclude
that (1) the partner lacked the power or control to force the firm to
take remedial action to eliminate the discrimination, and (2) other
partners, either through the firm's executive committee or the man-
aging partner, knew of the discrimination and failed to take remedial
action to eliminate it.299
Under this approach, Abby could bring a Title VII action against
the partnership, even if she is an equity partner. Abby, as a "person
294. Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, P.C., 969 F. Supp. 207, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (find-
ing that the plaintiff was an employee because, among other things, the majority share-
holders could fire the plaintiff at any time for any legal reason).
295. Id. at 217.
296. Id. (noting that a "preference for someone outside the protected class" satisfies
the plaintiffs requirement that the plaintiff was replaced by someone who is not a member
of a protected class).
297. Id.
298. Id. at 220.
299. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806-08 (1998); Swinton v.
Potomic Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that an employer is liable for
the discriminatory conduct of a co-worker if the plaintiff proves that the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment but did nothing to stop it); see also supra notes 9 and
10.
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aggrieved," would have standing because she is a member of the class
of direct victims who are entitled to enforce the remedial provisions of
Title VII. First, the firm has the requisite number of employees to trig-
ger Title VII application based on the number of the firm's associates
and administrative and clerical employees. Second, Abby can satisfy
the traditional McDonnell Douglas test because (1) she is a member of a
protected class; (2) she satisfactorily performed her duties as a part-
ner; (3) she suffered adverse employment decisions because Rob's
conduct was humiliating and unreasonably interfered with her ability
to effectively carry out her duties as a partner; and (4) the partnership
treated her less favorably than her fellow male equity partners by re-
quiring her to work in a sexually hostile environment.
Abby could also satisfy her burden of showing that she lacked the
power or control to force the firm to take remedial action. Abby is one
of seventy partners; the size of the partnership prevents her from in-
fluencing internal firm policy. Moreover, Rob has significantly more
power to affect the firm's policy as a member of the firm's executive
committee. Finally, Abby can meet her burden of showing that the
firm knew of the discriminatory conduct and failed to take any action
to eliminate it. Abby filed a formal complaint with the firm's executive
committee complaining about Rob's discriminatory conduct. In re-
sponse to her complaint, the executive committee failed to discipline
Rob or take any other action to protect Abby from Rob's sexual ad-
vances. Under the approach set forth in this Article, partnerships,
faced with potential discrimination lawsuits from equity partners like
Abby, will work to eliminate workplace discrimination wherever it ex-
ists in the partnership.
Conclusion
Lawyers should not lose access to the remedial protections of fed-
eral laws prohibiting workplace discrimination based on their success-
ful promotion to equity partner. Allowing equity partners to pursue
their rights as aggrieved persons under Title VII and the ADEA is con-
sistent with the national and congressional mandates that unlawful
workplace discrimination will not be tolerated. 300 The Civil Rights Act
300. As the Supreme Court recognized, "[T]he ADEA and Title VII share a common
purpose, the elimination of discrimination in the workplace." Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans,
441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979). Congress intended these statutes to remedy "the last vestiges" of
workplace discrimination. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
Statutes prohibiting workplace discrimination are intended to deter and compensate the
victims of prohibited workplace discrimination. Id. at 418.
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of 1964, as amended in 1991, demonstrates that Congress did not in-
tend to exclude lawyers, including equity partners, from the protec-
tions of federal laws prohibiting workplace discrimination. 30 1 Forcing
a lawyer to accept discriminatory conduct based on the lawyer's status
as an equity partner is inconsistent with Congress's intent to eliminate
workplace discrimination based on race, sex, and other immutable
characteristics.3 0 2 Consistent with the purpose of federal laws prohibit-
ing workplace discrimination, courts should examine whether an eq-
uity partner is seeking protection from unlawful employment
practices. Thus, if the equity partner can satisfy both Article III and
prudential standing requirements, then the court should find that an
equity partner is entitled to "to work in an environment free from
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult. '" 30
3
301. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
302. See supra notes 9, 173-79.
303. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
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